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I. Introduction
 
{1} Throughout American legal history the adequacy of traditional jurisprudence has been tested by
technological developments. [1] The creation and expanded use of the Internet is the latest of these
advancements. There are, however, characteristics of the Internet that distinguish it from past technological
breakthroughs. These features include the difficulty of defining the Internet in traditional terms, the plethora
of the contacts taking place, and the speed at which the Internet is expanding.
{2} Does the Internet necessitate an evolution or a revolution in legal thinking? The legal community
disagrees about whether the Internet is yet another breakthrough that can be incorporated into the classical
legal principals or whether the medium is so inherently different from reality that an entirely new paradigm is
necessary. The preceding notions of jurisdiction are based on a physical reality that does not exist in
cyberspace. Actions in the virtual world of the Internet, however, have legal ramifications in the tangible
world.[2] For that reason, and because of the undefined dangers involved in the wholesale creation of new
legal principals, established norms should be used to regulate this new technology. Personal jurisdiction
arising from Internet contacts presents the most difficult application of traditional law.
{3} An enormous amount of attention has been paid recently to jurisdictional issues arising from the
maintenance of Websites. There are, however, other methods by which persons can cross jurisdictional lines
via the Internet. Increasingly, business is being conducted via electronic means.[3] Contract formation may
require a meeting of the minds, but it does not require an actual meeting of the parties involved. Parties may
no longer rely on the "[p]hysical boundaries [that] typically have framed legal boundaries, in effect creating
signposts that warn that [they] will be required after crossing to abide by different rules."[4]
{4} This note will discuss the impact of CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson[5] ("CompuServe"). Section II outlines
the technological background of the Internet. Section III explores the appearance of jurisdictional law prior to
the CompuServe decision. Next, section IV relates the facts in CompuServe and examines the court's
reasoning and legal analysis. Section V analyzes some of the cases that have been decided since CompuServe.
Finally, section VI analyzes alternate theories upon which to base personal jurisdiction. 
 
II. Brief Introduction to the Technology
 
{5} In order to assess whether the traditional legal doctrines can adequately cover changes in technology, it is
necessary to understand the nature of the technology.[6] The Internet began, as ARPANET, in 1969 at the
Advanced Research Project Agency. It was developed as a way to connect the military, defense contractors,
and educational institutions conducting defense research.[7] The goal was to create a network of computers
for which there would be no central operating computer in order to reduce the risk that vital information and
communications would be lost if a computer on the network was damaged.[8]
{6} Decentralization was achieved through a series of redundant computer links. If a message cannot reach
its target through one path, it automatically re-routes itself and attempts to make the connection through a
different set of computers and networks.[9] Using "packet-switching" communications protocols, individual
messages are subdivided into segments that can also travel along different paths when a route becomes
overloaded. The message is reconstructed when it reaches its destination.[10]
{7} The network spread from government agencies and universities to corporations and individuals as other
networks formed and connected to ARPANET.[11] A common "language" was developed which allowed
different operating systems, such as Windows, Macintosh and UNIX, to speak to each other.[12]
{8} The Internet has no controlling body. It exists only by virtue of the numerous computers and networks
that are linked to it. There is no "centralized storage location, control point, or communications channel for
the Internet" and it would not be technologically practicable to create or assign one.[13]
 
III. State of Law of Jurisdiction
 
A. Traditional Exercise of Jurisdiction
{9} Personal jurisdiction is the right of a court to call a person before it to answer allegations made by
another party. The plaintiff, by virtue of filing suit, chooses the jurisdiction in which it elects to have the
dispute heard. The defendant then has the option of accepting the forum or filing a motion to dismiss in order
to escape the judgment of that jurisdiction on the substantive issue of the case.[14]
{10} Traditionally, a court could only exercise personal jurisdiction over persons present in the state in which
the action was brought.[15] This was a bright line rule that became less effective as interactions increased
between persons who are geographically distant.
B. Expansion of Jurisdiction by the Supreme Court
{11} The law has had to adapt to the development of faster modes of transportation and methods of
communication that lessen or negate a party's physical contact with the forum state.[16] The Supreme Court
determined that relaxation of the due process [17] limits on personal jurisdiction is appropriate because
"modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a state where he engages in economic activity."[18]
{12} The Court took a substantial step in this direction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.[19] The
Court created the "minimum contacts" test that allows for jurisdiction over a nonresident when such contacts
exist between the defendant and the forum State such that "maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[20] The Court's "minimum contacts" test for specific
jurisdiction[21]
abandon[s] more formalistic tests that focus on a defendant's 'presence' within a state in favor of
a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in
the context of our Federal system of government, to require it to defend the suit in that state.[22]
{13} Through International Shoe and its progeny,[23] the Court set out basic guidelines under which the
States must operate. The language in the Court opinions allowed for flexibility and a measure of fairness
under the law, but it has removed the certainty and uniformity that can only exist under a bright line rule.
C. Application of "Minimum Contacts"
{14} Constitutional due process provides the upper limit for state jurisdiction; it does not define it. State law
determines state court jurisdiction within the Constitutional boundaries. In response to the relaxed
requirements for jurisdiction, many States rewrote their laws. Some state long-arm statutes have defined
jurisdiction as that which is allowed under the Constitution,[24] while others are more specific.[25] Courts
located in states that describe personal jurisdiction with more specificity may not exercise jurisdiction over a
person, even though jurisdiction would not violate due process, unless the acts giving rise to the claim fall
within one of the statutory categories. For the purpose of this note, personal jurisdiction is defined as that
which is allowed by the U.S. Constitution.
{15} Typically, Federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction only to the extent a state court, in the state
in which the Federal court sits, may exercise jurisdiction under its long-arm statute.[26] There are few
statutory exceptions.[27] As a result, Federal courts also rely on the "minimum contacts" analysis to establish
personal jurisdiction.[28]
{16} The circuit courts have not been consistent in their application of the "minimum contacts" test. There
has, however, been movement toward uniformity with the development of a three-prong test:[29] (1) the
claim underlying the litigation "aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum;"[30] (2)
the defendant "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State;"[31]
and (3) "maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[32]
1. Claim Must Arise Out of or Relate to the Defendant's Contacts
{17} The court must determine whether the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts in order
to establish specific, as opposed to general, jurisdiction.[33] The test analyzes the connection between the
defendant's contacts and the suit. It is, therefore, a separate inquiry from the second prong, purposeful
availment, which analyzes the defendant's contacts as they relate to the forum state.
{18} Although the Court has twice had the opportunity to delineate the requirements of this prong of due
process analysis, it has failed to do so.[34] In the absence of any delineated test, the lower courts have applied
various tests that examine the relationship between the defendant's activities and the cause of action,
including the "but for" test and the substantive relevance-proximate cause test.[35]
{19} Also called the "made possible by" or the "lie in wake of" test, the "but for" test is satisfied when "the
plaintiff can trace the chain of events leading up to the cause of action and find that the defendant's activities
contribute to this chain."[36] Under the substantive relevance-proximate cause test, the defendant's contacts
must be substantively relevant to the cause of action.[37] This test would prevent jurisdiction in some cases
where the "but for" test would allow it.
2. Purposeful Availment
{20} Chief Justice Warren created the "purposeful availment" requirement in Hanson v. Denckla,[38] but the
Court did not articulate what "purposeful availment" required. The Court did, however, address the concept in
its decision in World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,[39] finding that purposefulness rests upon the reasonable
expectations of the defendant.
{21} Again, the Court again sought to define "purposeful availment" in Burger King v. Rudzewicz.[40]
"Purposeful availment" requires that the defendant create a "substantial connection" between himself and the
forum state.[41] The Court determined that "where the defendant 'deliberately' has engaged in significant
activities within a State . . ., or has created 'continuing obligations' between himself and the residents of the
forum, . . . he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there . . .."[42] The
Court considered a number of factors: "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with
the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing."[43] The Court also made it clear that those
contacts need not be direct.[44]
{22} In Asahi Metal, the Court was presented with the issue of whether placing something in the stream of
commerce is "purposeful availment."[45] Although the Court had already addressed this issue in World-Wide
Volkswagen,[46] application of this decision by the lower courts had resulted in confused and contradictory
rulings. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the issue focused on whether an automobile maker and distributor was
subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state into which the consumer drove the car after purchase.[47] In that
case, it was the unilateral actions of the consumer that brought the item into the jurisdiction. The Court
rejected the notion that actions by the consumer could create jurisdiction for the maker or distributor because
the "foreseeability" that the item would cross into another jurisdiction was not sufficient contact with that
jurisdiction.[48] Confusion resulted in the lower courts in cases where the actions of the defendant put the
item into the stream of commerce.[49] Some courts determined that the act of putting the item into the stream
satisfied the due process requirements, while other courts required activities "more purposefully directed at
the forum State."[50]
{23} In Asahi, the O'Connor plurality rejected the stream of commerce theory.[51] There is no purposeful
availment when the item is simply placed in the stream of commerce because the defendant did not "create,
control or employ" the distribution network and did not design its product for the forum state's market,[52]
although it was arguably aware that a significant amount of product would go to that State.[53] Awareness
does not equate with an act of purposeful availment; there must be some "intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum state."[54] The Court gave examples of additional conduct that would prove that intent
or purpose: "designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State."[55]
{24} The Brennan plurality favored stream of commerce as a method of purposeful availment[56] because of
the benefit received by the defendant and because the defendant was, or should have been, aware that its
products were going to the forum state.[57] Brennan determined that additional contacts were not necessary
because "[t]he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and
anticipated flow from manufacture to distribution to retail sale."[58] As long as the defendant was aware that
the product was being marketed in the forum state, it could not be surprised that it might have to defend itself
there.[59]
{25} Few courts had adopted O'Connor's restrictive interpretation of the due process requirements at the time
Asahi Metal was decided,[60] and there are some jurisdictions that still follow the bare stream of commerce
test supported by Brennan. The Fifth Circuit has specifically refused to require additional contacts.[61] Other
courts have found jurisdiction based on the "stream of commerce plus," finding additional contacts which are
less concrete that those listed by O'Connor. These include: substantial sales in the forum state,[62] a
significant role in the industry,[63] or when the court determined that the defendant created the stream of
commerce.[64]
3. Reasonableness
{26} The Court engages in a "flexible inquiry" of whether "a defendant's contacts with the forum State made
it reasonable, in the context of the Federal system of government, to require it to defend the suit in that State."
[65] In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, the Court outlined five relevant factors:
(1) the defendant's burden in defending in the foreign forum,
(2) the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute,
(3) the plaintiff's interest in securing "convenient and effective" relief,
(4) the interest of the judicial system in "obtaining the most effective resolution of
controversies," and
(5) "the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies."[66]
Most of the circuit courts adhere to these factors.[67]
{27} As applied by many circuits, the reasonableness requirement is presumptively met when minimum
contacts have been established.[68] According to the Supreme Court, however, the purposeful availment and
reasonableness requirements are separate inquiries.[69]
{28} The end result of International Shoe, and the line of cases that follow it, is a flexible doctrine, focused
on the actions of the party threatened with the greatest burden. The result of this flexibility is a certain amount
of uncertainty, particularly when a court is faced with stream of commerce issues. The shared characteristics
of Internet commerce and interstate commerce, such as the lack of particular territoriality during transmission
and the awareness of, and expectation that, products placed in these streams will cross numerous
jurisdictional borders, lay at the heart of the doctrinal difficulties.
{29} While there is no doubt that the law of jurisdiction is flexible enough to fit around the Internet, the
particular reach of the law was uncertain. It is with those issues in mind that the Sixth Circuit decided
CompuServe v. Patterson. 
 
IV. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson[70]
A. Factual Background
{30} Defendant Patterson, a Texas resident, subscribed to CompuServe, Inc., an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) headquartered in Ohio. Patterson had never visited Ohio when he entered into a Shareware Registration
Agreement (SRA) with CompuServe.[71] The SRA allowed Patterson to transmit shareware files to
CompuServe to be displayed and downloaded by other CompuServe subscribers.[72] Subscribers who used
the shareware beyond a specified period of time voluntarily paid CompuServe, who deducted a 15% fee and
transferred the balance to Patterson.[73] Under the agreement, Patterson also advertised his shareware on the
CompuServe service.[74]
{31} Between 1991 and 1994, Patterson transmitted thirty-two shareware files to CompuServe, which were
then stored on the company's system in Ohio.[75] According to Patterson, only twelve CompuServe
subscribers who downloaded and purchased software were Ohio residents and the revenue totaled less than
$650 from subsequent sales to those persons.[76]
{32} A dispute arose between Patterson and CompuServe regarding possible trademark infringement by
CompuServe when it marketed a product similar to that provided by Patterson. CompuServe filed suit in Ohio
District Court seeking a declaratory judgment in the matter.[77] CompuServe claimed it would suffer
approximately $10.8 million in loss of sales revenues if Patterson were successful.[78]
{33} The District Court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, granted Patterson's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).[79] The Sixth Circuit, in this
case, reversed the District Court decision.
B. Standard of Review
{34} When the defendant raises the issue of personal jurisdiction, the court has the power to hold an
evidentiary hearing. If the court chooses not to hold such a hearing, the plaintiff need only show a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss.[80]
C. Jurisdictional Analysis
{35} The Sixth Circuit relied on the Ohio long-arm statute and due process requirements to establish specific
jurisdiction over the defendant. Under the Ohio long-arm statute, "[a] court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's . .
. Transacting any business in this state. . ."[81] The "transacting business" clause of the Ohio long-arm statute
is limited only by Constitutional notions of due process.[82] The Sixth Circuit employs a three-prong test to
determine the due process limits of jurisdiction: (1) whether the defendant's activities gave rise to the cause of
action, (2) whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in the
forum state, and (3) whether jurisdiction would be reasonable.[83]
1. Defendant's Activities Gave Rise to the Cause of Action
{36} The Sixth Circuit has rejected the substantive relevance-proximate cause test, as well as the less
restrictive "but for" test.[84] Instead, the first prong of the test is met as long as the activities are not unrelated
to the cause of action.[85]
{37} Patterson placed his software with CompuServe. The Sixth Circuit rejected the District Court's
determination that the placement of software in Ohio was insufficient to establish activities giving rise to the
cause of action.[86] The fact that the software could have been placed with a different ISP, and the infringing
activity would have nevertheless occurred, did not negate the court's determination. The possibility of another
factual situation was irrelevant because the actual facts showed activity in the forum state.[87]
{38} The court also determined that Patterson's threats of legal action were relevant contacts with Ohio.
Patterson contacted CompuServe through regular and electronic mail threatening to seek an injunction
against CompuServe.[88] Those threats resulted in the action seeking declaratory judgement.[89]
{39} The court's broad definition of a cause of action arising from the defendant's actions is disturbing. The
court determined that the threat of suit made by the defendant was an activity in the forum state related to the
cause of action.[90] While this is factually correct, it may have adverse effects. According to this standard,
someone who has purposefully availed himself of the benefits of a state should be wary about seeking
settlement before filing suit. When a dispute arises between two parties, both should rush to the nearest court
and promptly file suit. It is unlikely that the court intended to promote a race to the courthouse.
{40} That court's broad language is tempered, however, by other considerations upon which it relied. The
court did not hold that the threats alone would have been sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test.
Further, as noted, the court also relied on the presence of Patterson's software in the Ohio system.
2. Purposeful Availment
{41} In the Sixth Circuit, purposeful availment requires that "the defendant's contacts with the forum State
"proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a "substantial connection" with the
forum State, 'and [that] the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he 'should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'"[91] The court further noted that physical presence is not
essential to establish personal jurisdiction.[92]
{42} The Sixth Circuit found that the defendant "created a connection" between himself and the forum state.
[93] He subscribed to CompuServe and entered into a Shareware Registration Agreement.[94] The Shareware
Registration Agreement and the CompuServe Service Agreement, which was incorporated by reference,
designated Ohio as the forum state. Further, the CompuServe Service Agreement specifically provided that it
was governed by Ohio law.[95] According to the court, Patterson was on notice that Ohio law would govern.
[96] Defendant's connection with Ohio was further demonstrated by the continuous flow of software from the
defendant to the forum over a three year period, his advertisement of the software on the CompuServe
system, and his financial demands on the company that led to the suit.[97]
{43} The court then determined that those contacts were "substantial" enough to find purposeful availment.
The court compared this case to Burger King v. Rudzewicz.[98] In Burger King, the defendant negotiated with
an out-of-state corporation and entered into a twenty-year franchise contract that included a choice-of-law
provision.[99] The defendant also perpetuated a relationship by agreeing to supervision by the corporate
headquarters, located in the forum state, and by sending all notices and payments to the forum state
headquarters.[100] The Court concluded that the choice-of-law provision, although not dispositive, was a
factor to be considered.[101] The actions by the defendant before, during, and after the contract was signed
established a substantial connection between him and the forum state.[102]
{44} The Sixth Circuit took note of the ongoing nature of the relationship between Patterson and
CompuServe.[103] Just as the defendants in Burger King reached out to the Florida corporation to create a
long-term contract, Patterson deliberately created and maintained a relationship with CompuServe. Also like
the defendant in Burger King, the contacts between Patterson and the forum state did not end after he signed
the contract.[104] The combination of the contract, the introduction of Patterson's software into the stream of
commerce, the transmission of the software to CompuServe, and the advertisement and sale of the software
through the CompuServe system created a substantial connection between the defendant and the forum state.
[105]
{45} The court did not find that the small number of sales from the defendant to purchasers in the forum state
was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, contrary to the District Court's reliance on the de minimis amount of
software sales.[106] The court looked at the quality rather than the quantity of the contacts, which were
"deliberate and repeated," and refused to ignore the sales made to residents of other jurisdictions through the
CompuServe system.[107]
{46} The court distinguished Reynolds v. Intn'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n[108] and Health Communications,
Inc. v. Mariner Corp.,[109] cases relied upon by the District Court in determining the contacts were not
substantial. Patterson differed from the defendant in Reynolds in that he signed a written contract which
included a choice-of-law provision, and he "perpetuated" the relationship through his contacts with the Ohio
system.[110] The court also found that, unlike the defendant in Health Communications, Patterson was more
than a mere purchaser of services. As a third-party provider of a product, his business required Internet access
in order to operate.
3. Reasonableness of Jurisdiction
{47} The final requirement is that a court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant "must comport with
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[111] Note, however, that after the Sixth Circuit has
found purposeful availment and a cause of action arising from the activities in the forum state, there is a
presumption that making a defendant amenable to the court's jurisdiction will be reasonable.[112]
{48} The factors used to determine reasonableness include: "the burden on the defendant, the interest of the
forum state, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of the other states in securing the most
efficient resolution of controversies."[113] The court found that jurisdiction was reasonable for the following
reasons: (1) the defendant knew of the burden of defending himself in Ohio when he entered into the
Shareware Registration Agreement and chose to accept that burden; (2) the forum state had an interest in
settling a dispute that involves a company within its jurisdiction; and (3) CompuServe had a large amount of
money at stake if it lost the trademark infringement suit and the decision would affect its relationship with
other shareware providers.[114]
{49} The Sixth Circuit had the opportunity, as the first appellate court to hear an Internet jurisdiction case, to
find that Internet cases are so unusual that the lack of reasonableness overcomes the existence of the first two
prongs of the test. The court did not feel that this case merited "ferreting out."[115] 
 
V. Decisions Subsequent to CompuServe
 
{50} Although the Sixth Circuit limited the holding to CompuServe to the facts of the case, other courts have
followed its analysis. The following is a description of major Internet commercial activity cases that have
come before the bench since CompuServe. It does not, however, include cases involving only website activity
on the Internet, which include: Bensusan v. King,[116] Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,[117] Inset System v.
Instruction Set,[118] Maritz v. Cybergold,[119] Cybersell v. Cybersell.[120]
A. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent-A-Car Corp.[121]
{51} The Avis rental company, headquartered in New York, brought suit against various licensees to
determine whether it could enter the replacement car rental market in the areas in which its licensees were
located. The District Court dismissed the suit against the licensees for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting
that the defendants made few trips to the forum state.[122] The Second Circuit found jurisdiction based upon
the licensees' use of Avis's computerized reservation system, located in New York. The court found that the
licensees were transacting business under the New York long-arm statute.[123] Notably, the court also
questioned whether physical contacts with a state were of any "critical consequence" in the modern era.[124]
B. Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc.[125]
{52} This case involved a dispute between two corporations that operated electronic services and distributed
software over the Internet. Digital brought suit against AltaVista for breach of a trademark licensing
agreement, trademark and servicemark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution. Digital
purchased AltaVista's rights to its trademark and then licensed it back to AltaVista to use in certain prescribed
ways. AltaVista allegedly violated that licensing agreement by using the name for its search engine.[126]
{53} The Massachusetts District Court took note of the need to re-evaluate the traditional territory-based
concepts of jurisdiction as dictated by CompuServe,[127] and found that traditional concepts were adequate.
[128] The court held that the fact that the subject matter of the suit was technological did not necessitate any
shift in the analysis. The court was able to set aside the uniqueness of the technology and found that the heart
of the matter was a typical contract dispute.[129]
C. People v. Lipsitz[130]
{54} The New York Attorney General sought to enforce consumer fraud and false advertising laws against
several related companies, physically present in the State, based on the claim that the defendants targeted the
fraudulent conduct and false advertisements at a nationwide audience using e-mail.[131] Respondents
claimed that the court did not have jurisdiction over the Internet activity.[132]
{55} The court held that traditional standards for jurisdiction were adequate to cover the novel litigation.
[133] The court found that the defendants were physically located in the state because the companies
conducted business "within the forum state by being a subscriber to a local Internet service provider and
[sold] a product through that provider."[134] The court also held that the defendants' acts were sufficiently
connected with the forum because the acts physically occurred in the forum, even though the impact may
have been felt in another jurisdiction.[135]
D. Edias Software Intn'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Intn'l, Ltd.[136]
{56} Edias and Basis entered into a contract under which Edias would distribute Basis's software products.
[137] Edias had one office in Arizona and two overseas.[138] Basis's office was located in New Mexico; the
contracts were signed in New Mexico; and the contracts stated that they would be governed by New Mexico
law.[139] Basis terminated the contract, sending personal e-mail messages to its customers and employees
and posting a press release on a webpage and on an online forum.[140] Edias filed suit in Arizona, alleging
breach of contract and "covenant of good faith and fair dealing," and violation of the Lanham Act because of
the online activity by Basis after the breach.[141] Basis sought to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
[142]
{57} The court examined whether the contract and the events surrounding it showed that the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the protections and benefits of the forum state. The court found that the plaintiff
made a prima facie case for jurisdiction because the defendant, Basis, "contacted EDIAS employees via
telephone, fax, and e-mail communications, sold thousands of dollars worth of products to EDIAS for
distribution, sent invoices to EDIAS in Arizona, BASIS employees . . . visited Arizona, and . . . BASIS
disseminated allegedly defamatory statements about EDIAS that were both directed at and caused harm in
Arizona."[143]
E. Panavision Intn'l, L.P. v. Toeppen[144]
{58} Panavision, a California company, sued Toeppen, an Illinois resident, for trademark infringement
resulting from the defendant's alleged "cybersqatting."[145] The court found that California had jurisdiction
over the defendant, but made it clear that CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson was distinguishable because the
defendant's actions could not be defined as "doing business."[146] Instead of broadening the analysis of
CompuServe to cover circumstances not envisioned by the Sixth Circuit, the court applied tort analysis and
found jurisdiction under the "effects" test created in Calder v. Jones.[147]
F. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.[148]
{59} Zippo Manufacturing, a Pennsylvania corporation, brought suit against Zippo Dot Com, a California
corporation, for trademark infringement arising from the use of domain names, such as "zippo.com" and
"zippo.net" for its news business. The defendant's contacts, in addition to the sales through its Internet
website, included contracting with seven ISPs in Pennsylvania through which subscribers could access the
news. The court found jurisdiction proper because the defendant was "doing business" in Pennsylvania and
refused to find jurisdiction based on the website activity.[149] 
 
VI. The Future of the Law of Internet
 
{60} The decisions following CompuServe suggest a number of truths. First, the importance of physical
presence is gone. Although the Court determined, in International Shoe,[150] that physical presence was not
necessary in order to exercise jurisdiction, the Court did not hold that physical presence was irrelevant. Only
in recent years has physical contact with the forum state been viewed as a co-equal with the other factors that
the courts consider.[151] Given the nature of the modern world, this change is reasonable and necessary.
Physical presence was important at a point in time when people had very little ability to affect anyone from a
distance. Modern technology has allowed the average person to travel farther and more often. Greater
mobility has increased the likelihood that a person's legal rights can be affected by someone who resides a
great distance away. Current technology allows a person to diminish another's legal interests without ever
stepping foot in the same jurisdiction. Because there are so many ways to harm a person without physical
presence, it has very little value when deciding jurisdiction.
{61} Second, other courts agree with the proposition that traditional legal principles are adequate to govern
this untraditional medium.[152] The best way to do this is by application of the law only to the extent
necessary to cover the facts of the individual case. The Sixth Circuit limited its opinion to the facts of the
case and other courts have followed this wise example. They have limited their holdings as well and refused
to apply the CompuServe framework to inappropriate cases.[153]
{62} Lastly, contacts made through Internet contacts, different from those made through websites, are
conceptually easier to deal with than trying to find jurisdiction based solely on website activity.[154] For that
reason, the courts have separated the two types of cases and applied differing analysis. When the court looks
at Internet contacts arising from more than the maintenance of a website, the facts can easily fit within the
traditional jurisdiction analysis. Because of the unique nature of the Internet, some commentators are
suggesting an entirely new standard for all Internet cases without regard to the two distinct classes. Due to the
flexible nature of jurisdictional analysis, it is possible that some of the suggested changes will be adopted by
the courts. Such a move would be unwise.
A. Creating an Autonomous Jurisdiction
{63} Although it seems like science fiction, a member of the Illinois Bar has suggested that the virtual
community is sufficiently organized to create its own "customs, norms, and rules."[155] He points to
troubling examples, including the application of physical community standards to online obscenity, as
illustrations of how the application of local law does not adequately or efficiently settle disputes.[156] He
also further argues that those who built cyberspace have a claim to it.[157] The courts should either refuse to
extend their laws or defer to the judgment of the informal community.[158]
{64} The impossibility of these suggestions is obvious. The autonomy and anonymity with which people are
able move through the virtual world prevents any legitimate chance of effective self-governance. People
interacting online do so through "screen" or e-mail names which often have no relation to their actual
identity. Although people who violate the informal norms established in the cyberspace community may be
electronically banished, there is nothing to prevent them from wreaking havoc under a new identity.[159]
{65} Even if it were possible to virtually govern on-line activity, such governance ignores the impact that
virtual activity has on the physical world. Jurisdiction is the area of the law that deals most directly with that
contact between the two "worlds." Jurisdiction creates the right to find satisfaction for harm. If this area of the
law is unsettled, the rights of citizens are undetermined. That is a proposition that cannot and should not be
made a reality. It is an area of the law for which "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right."[160] The question then becomes how to settle this point of law within the
bounds of the traditional legal framework.
B. Adopting Brennan's Interpretation of the Stream of Commerce
{66} Commentators have argued that although the CompuServe analysis works well in this case, it causes
more problems than it solves.[161] Requiring more than placement in the stream of commerce necessitates a
deeper evidentiary assessment of the contacts between the defendant and the forum state. For example, the
court must find that the defendant has purposefully contacted the forum,[162] which the court arguably did
not do in CompuServe. The court never addressed whether Patterson knew that he was contacting Ohio when
he dialed in, nor did they show that he was even aware that CompuServe was located in Ohio. The court
seemed to rely on the choice-of-law provision, which did not reveal the location of the CompuServe
computer system, to establish Patterson's knowledge.[163]
{67} The alternative approach would be to adopt the Brennan plurality opinion in Asahi Metal. The burden
on the courts would certainly be lighter. The court would not have to determine purposeful direction at the
forum state under Brennan's stream of commerce analysis because the defendant would be held to the
awareness that the software and the contacts could reach any forum.[164] Unlike O'Connor, Brennan does not
ignore the fact that "a regular course of sales represents the most basic commercial manifestation of
purposefulness."[165]
{68} Brennan's analysis also seems to note that the exercise of jurisdiction will not be overly broad because it
requires the "regular and anticipated flow of products."[166] The basis of the theory is that it would not be
unfair to subject such a person to jurisdiction because it is that person's actions that gave rise to jurisdiction.
[167]
{69} In CompuServe, Justice O'Connor's interpretation of purposeful availment and the stream of commerce
triumphed over that of Justice Brennan. Although the court required more than mere placement in the stream
to exercise jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit had no problem finding that jurisdiction was proper. The additional
contacts required under the "stream of commerce plus" doctrine protect state sovereignty without restricting
the court's access to parties that have had substantial contacts with its jurisdiction. Applying Brennan's
version of stream of commerce analysis, Patterson could have conceivably been hailed into court in any
jurisdiction where Patterson's software landed. On the Internet, there is virtually no part of the world where
Patterson's shareware could not be expected to go.
{70} Although requiring additional contacts may or may not have been sound policy when the defendant was
physically marketing in the stream of commerce, it is an absolute necessity in the virtual stream. First, the
defendant who places something into the virtual stream does so instantaneously, leaving no time to reconsider
before it enters the market. Second, the marketing is omnipresent. There is no way for the defendant to
refrain from marketing in a particular jurisdiction.[168] 
 
VII. Conclusion
 
{71} Incremental and conservative change in jurisdiction law is right, not only because it is the only choice,
but because it is the best choice. This means that the parameters of the law have been defined, and the courts
will have to apply it to new factual situations as needed. For example, what constitutes additional contacts
may well change as the ability to reach out through technology expands. What the court must avoid is
throwing out the existing law in favor of a legal panacea, such as Internet self-regulation, or adopting the
broadest version of the stream of commerce test that will create national and international jurisdiction over
anyone who conducts business over the Internet.
{72} The short-term result of piecemeal "redefinition" of the law of personal jurisdiction may well be
contradiction and confusion, but this is a necessary evil. Any law that presumes to be all-inclusive risks
unjust results. The long-term gain from this "organized confusion" is that the lower courts will act as a testing
ground for new twists on the traditional jurisprudence. The limited lack of uniformity can be justified based
upon the theory that a multitude of possible answers is better than one mediocre answer. A compromise
between competing interests has the best chance of producing the most effective, least rigid result.
{73} The use of the Internet to conduct business is constantly expanding. It gives parties an opportunity to
transfer information quickly and inexpensively. Business that once required face-to-face contact can now be
accomplished between persons who have never set foot in the jurisdiction of the party with which they are
contracting. CompuServe v. Patterson dealt with a business that operated exclusively on the Internet, but
many businesses for whom computers are merely useful tools are beginning to use the Internet to conduct
normal business transactions, such as placing work orders and signing contracts.
{74} While the impact of the Internet on society has been drastic, its impact on the law need not be as
extreme. The Supreme Court recognized in 1945 that the law needed to balance the flexibility required for
technological change with the certainty required for the efficient conduct of business. Although the lower
courts have differed as to the minutia of the law, they have all sought to establish guidelines that fit within the
present legal scheme.
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In this case, the court ordered the defendant to refrain from marketing its product to customers in the United
States and to refund purchases already made. This was possible only with respect to the segment of the
website that required the user to subscribe in order to view the more explicit images. The court did not, and
could not, order the defendant to limit the users access to the free images.
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